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CEO to the Rescue: 
Residential Proximity of Private Firm CEOs and  
the Evolution of Corporate Profitability 
By WOOJIN KIM AND DONG-RYUNG YANG* 
This paper documents how the net profit margin of private firms 
improves when the CEOs of the companies relocate their primary 
residence to be closer to the corporate headquarters. By reviewing 
127 Korean non-public companies belonging to 66 private business 
groups, we find that the top managers move closer to the headquarters 
when the profitability of the firms has recently deteriorated. A one 
basis point decline in the margin causes CEOs to relocate their homes 
approximately two kilometers closer to their corporate headquarters. 
The profit margin rebounds after their relocation. This finding implies 
that physical proximity can serve as a proxy for personal commitment. 
Key Word: CEO, Corporate Governance, Geographic, Commitment 
JEL Code: G30, G34, G39 
 
 
  I. Introduction 
 
hief executive officers (CEOs) are individuals who make critical decisions 
regarding their corporations. Therefore, their level of commitment is essential 
for their businesses to flourish. However, the current literature rarely touches upon 
the issue of how to measure the level of CEO commitment. Most studies dealing 
with the link between CEOs’ efforts and firm performance assume that CEOs are 
best incentivized when their personal net incomes are maximized.1 However, the 
literature seldom provides any specific channel by which CEOs commit to their 
business. In this paper, we examine how close CEOs’ residential homes are to their 
corporate headquarters as a proxy for their level of commitment and study how 
different levels of the commitment are related to the profitability of their firms.  
There are several reasons that make it more than a simple and random choice for 
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1See Brown et al. (2007) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), among others. 
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CEOs when they decide where to live. First, residential relocation is not an easy 
decision considering the time and expenses required when searching for a desirable 
residence and considering factors such as school transfers for children. Therefore, 
once CEOs choose a certain region, it is highly likely that they will stay for a 
while, trying to remain at ease in the location as long as they can. As residential 
relocation is such a difficult decision, it represents significant determination of any 
type once made by a CEO. Second, CEOs can choose a residential area without 
rigid budget constraints and can also afford long commutes in general compared to 
low-ranked employees. Unlike most low-ranked employees, CEOs may have far 
fewer financial restrictions with regard to selecting where to live, and they may 
have a wider range of options when choosing a residential area. CEOs can also 
more flexibly decide when they should appear in their offices. In other words, they 
have more discretion in adjusting their schedules such that that they do not need to 
come to their offices at a fixed time on a daily basis. This sort of flexibility makes 
CEOs more able to endure a long commute, as they can manage most of their 
official duties and minimize losses of their personal time during business hours, 
and compensate for the long commute accordingly. Under circumstances which 
allow wider options with regard to their residence, when CEOs relocate closer to 
corporate headquarters, it distinguishes them as individuals willing to pay more 
attention to daily business operations.  
To study the link between CEO residential proximity and firm performance, a 
specific group of companies was deliberately selected to best fit our research 
purpose. The group covers pairs (or ‘trines’) of Korean private companies, both (or 
all) of which are managed by a single CEO. There are several reasons behind the 
selection of this sample set.   
First, large listed firms do not serve our research purposes well, as the daily 
business operations of these types of firms are mostly conducted by a group of 
professional managers who are well equipped with their own specialties. Under 
such an environment, a different commitment level of a single CEO does not have 
a critical impact on the firm’s profitability, as more of critical decisions are not 
made by the single CEO but by a group of professional managers compared to a 
private company, where a single CEO maintains more dominant leadership. 
Equivalently, for large listed firms, the CEO’s residential proximity to corporate 
headquarters becomes less relevant to their level of commitment because, for listed 
firms, it is not a single person but a management system that manages most daily 
business operations. The management system inside large listed firms is well 
supported by state-of-the-art business intelligence software which gathers and 
analyzes massive amounts of information efficiently, providing timely reports to 
assist with critical decisions. This type of systemic approach to the general 
management of large listed firms makes the CEO’s geographical commitment less 
influential over how well the firm is managed.  
Second, we study and compare only pairs (or trines) of companies controlled by 
the same CEO for the following reasons. Suppose that we find that a firm’s 
profitability deteriorates when the CEO of the firm relocates his/her home further 
from the firm’s headquarters. Such a finding establishes a false causality if we 
naively interpret it as evidence that the CEO’s relocation to a more remote region 
reflects a reduced level of commitment and, therefore, compromises profitability. 
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In fact, the decision to relocate farther away may not be an indication of a lower 
level of commitment but merely a simple move to provide a better schooling 
environment for the children of the CEO. As a partial remedy, we opt to trace 
changes in the CEO’s residential proximity and firm profitability after controlling 
for CEO-fixed effects that may be embedded within each private business group. 
Despite the possibility of a CEO living away (closer) from (to) the corporate 
headquarters for unrevealed personal reasons, it reduces the chance to establish 
false causality when we study the values of residential proximity between a pair or 
trines of companies under the same CEO’s supervision. Therefore, if we can find 
any systemic evidence showing that changes in commuting distance are related to 
differences in profitability in the firms controlled by identical CEOs, the evidence 
becomes less vulnerable to the potential criticism of spurious causation.  
Third, the Korean regulatory system provides unique data, such as annual 
financial data for private companies and the history of the CEO’s residential 
addresses. This informational advantage makes a study of this type feasible in 
Korea, as it would be unachievable in other countries. Korea is a country where 
business groups are prevalent even among private companies and where a public 
financial data warehouse (“DART”) reliably provides financial statements from 
private companies, as long as the size of the company exceeds a certain threshold.2 
This unique environment indicates that Korea is a good place to analyze pairs of 
private firms under the control of the same CEO.  
Fourth, without exception, the CEOs studied in this paper are all controlling 
shareholders of our sample firms. This phenomenon prevails, as relatively small-
sized family businesses can seldom afford high-quality professional managers 
and/or the owner-managers are presumably most dedicated to the specific fields in 
which they spot new business opportunities. The individuals exert themselves to 
promote opportunities to build their family business empires. This unique 
environment, specifically the perfect match between CEOs’ private incentives and 
the prosperity of their family businesses, makes research on their level of 
commitment more reliable than a study of professional managers whose personal 
incentives are often not best aligned with those of the firms for which they work. 
Lastly, the home addresses of CEOs managing private companies are obviously 
private information and are not obtainable from public sources in general. This 
characteristic of the information has thus far made geographical analyses of private 
companies challenging. Fortunately enough, the Korean Supreme Court runs a 
public corporate registration system (www.iros.go.kr) where various bodies of 
corporate information are disclosed to the public when there is any change for such 
information. Although the system does not offer data in a fully automated manner, 
it still allows any individual to examine the business information of any company, 
as long as the individual pays a certain processing fee and is willing to endure the 
laborious task in flipping through corporate profiles in the system. The corporate 
information includes the history of CEO turnover, the CEO’s residential addresses, 
the total amount of equity issued or to be issued, debt issuance, and other pertinent 
 
2DART stands for Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer, which is a data warehouse managed by the Korean 
Financial Supervisory Service (“FSS”). A private company in Korea is required to report audited financial 
statements to DART, once the company’s total asset exceeds KRW 10 billion, equivalent of USD 10 million. 
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information. By seeking this type of corporate information in the registration 
system, we construct a dataset of how each private company CEO’s home address 
changes over time. This unique data enables us to study how geographic factors at 
the individual level affect firm-level performance among private companies.   
Several questions are proposed regarding the relationship between a CEO’s 
residential proximity and their firm’s accounting performance. How does a firm’s 
profitability change as the CEO moves their home further away (closer) from (to) 
the corporate headquarters? How does year-over-year profitability of a given firm 
evolve before and after the CEO relocates their residence? What motivates a CEO 
to move closer to their corporate headquarters? 
The overall empirical findings of this paper indicate that the CEO’s residential 
proximity and the firm’s accounting performance are positively correlated after 
controlling for CEO-fixed effects and industry-specific factors. Private firms’ 
accounting performances improve when the CEOs of the firms move their 
residences closer to the corporate headquarters. When we look into year-over-year 
progress on net profitability within each private company, the profit margin in 
excess of the industry average is found to grow when the CEO’s residential home is 
closer to their corporate headquarters. A test of average profitability before and 
after the CEOs’ relocation closer to the firm reveals that, on average, the net profit 
margin is weaker before the relocation than it is after the CEOs move closer. An 
investigation of the ten-year progress of net profitability across such relocations 
also confirms that the net profit margin consistently declines during the four years 
before the CEOs’ residential move closer to the head offices whereas the margin 
improves in the long run after their relocation. Combining the findings above, we 
show that the CEOs of private firms commit themselves to their businesses by 
relocating closer to the firms once they find persistent and serious declines in 
corporate profitability and that such commitment rewards the CEOs given the 
revitalization of the profitability in the long run.  
Existing literature proposes a possible mechanism to explain how individual-
level commitment enhances corporate profitability. Porter (1996) argues that 
“dedicated positioning” is critical to earning and maintaining excessive profits, and 
finds that profitable companies are more likely to implement one of the following 
positioning strategies: releasing differentiated products, offering a competitive edge 
on cost management, or a combination of the two. The author stresses that such 
competitive positioning becomes viable only with the serious dedication of related 
stakeholders. Allen and Meyer (1990) conceptualize under what circumstances 
individuals commit themselves to their work. The authors argue that individuals 
show high levels of dedication when they are emotionally attached to the 
workplaces (“affective commitment”), when they have fewer alternative career 
options outside their current job (“continuance commitment”), and/or when they 
regard loyalty toward their current employers as a sort of “norm” and feel obligated 
to stay with them (“normative commitment”). Lee and Miller (1999) found that 
employee commitment is positively correlated with corporate profitability and 
argue that dedication in employees makes an organization more profitable.  
The CEOs investigated here are unique in the sense that they are capitalists 
whose incomes are mostly generated from individual instances of capital 
investment. However, at the same time they maintain their status as corporate 
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employees, being paid for their labor for the organization. With the existing 
framework presented by Allen and Meyer (1990) applied, top executives become 
eligible candidates for testing the effects of an alleviated level of professional 
commitment on firm profitability. The companies investigated in this study were 
either founded by the CEOs themselves or inherited from their parents. Due to the 
nature of family heritage, the CEOs have a solid reason to be affectionate about the 
business empire nurtured by their family successfully, going through countless 
hardships (“affective commitment”). Shouldering the family legacy, the CEOs 
grow accustomed to the loyalty to their family business as a norm to abide by 
(“normative commitment”). Moreover, as most of their personal wealth heavily 
relies on the success of the business, the controlling individuals of private firms 
have a serious incentive to commit themselves to the businesses. Once the family 
business goes under, the individuals’ career options outside the firms are limited, as 
they have spent most of their professional careers within their family circles 
(“continuance commitment”). The unique characteristics of the CEOs of private 
firms make them most likely to be committed to the firm and enable us to test how 
their individual levels of commitment influence the profitability of their companies.  
However, measurements of professional commitment tend to be subjective and 
remain difficult to quantify. This paper contributes to the related literature by 
presenting one possible measurement of the commitment level which is more 
objective and more appropriate for quantifying the depth of dedication. The study 
uses private firm CEO residential proximity to gauge the level of commitment and 
reports that a corporation becomes more profitable when the CEO move closer to 
the firm. Additional empirical tests reveal that CEOs relocate their residences 
closer to corporate headquarters when the firms recently record poor performance. 
With their CEOs moving closer, firm profitability gradually improves in the long 
run. As proposed by Porter (1996), such personal dedication enables the CEOs to 
manage costs more intensely and to innovate with current products, both of which 
lead to higher profitability. While a previous study (Lee and Miller 1999) reports a 
positive correlation between employee commitment and corporate profitability, this 
paper differentiates itself from earlier studies by presenting a concrete method with 
which to quantify personal dedication. Lee and Miller (1999) use questionnaire 
surveys to measure individual commitment, a method often vulnerable to the 
possible criticisms of biased sample selection and dishonest responses. In contrast, 
our paper measures professional commitment in a more objective manner, i.e., the 
commuting distance of top executives, and quantifies the impact of their 
commitment on corporate profitability. Our results suggest that the CEOs of private 
Korean companies move approximately two kilometers closer to their corporate 
headquarters in response to a one basis point decline in the net profit margin. 
This paper contributes to the body of work in interdisciplinary geographic and 
corporate finance fields by initially arguing that physical proximity serves as a 
good proxy for personal commitment, especially when (1) a person’s success (or 
wealth) is best aligned with the business for which they work; (2) the individual is 
determined to be devoted to the business, but (3) the prosperity of the business is in 
peril. We report that the individual reveals his/her commitment to the business by 
relocating his/her residence closer to the business so that he/she may handle daily 
operations better, especially when the profitability of the enterprise substantially 
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drops. The effort to turn the enterprise around requires additional years to see the 
business eventually revive. 
Previous studies interpret proximity as an intermediary of information sharing or 
networking opportunities. On the other hand, this paper conceives of proximity by 
presenting the new possibility that physical adjacency means another aspect, that 
is, personal commitment, rather than concepts already proposed in the literature. 
Within the new frame, proximity is not an intermediary by which information or 
social bonds are shared but an outcome which is realized by an individual’s effort 
and dedication. 
The remaining part of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the 
current literature related to geographic topics within the financial economics 
context, while Section III shows the empirical results of tests on the questions 
raised above. Section IV concludes the paper with brief comments on its 
limitations. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
One of the most celebrated topics linking local factors in the finance literature is 
how location affects stock returns. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) report portfolio 
managers’ excess returns as earned by nearby investments. Mutual fund managers 
are found to invest more in firms located closer to pertinent individuals, as 
managers are in a better position to investigate firms located closer to them and to 
gain the upper hand when attempting to possess the timely and accurate 
information necessary for successful investment decisions. In consequence, the 
investment professionals gain superior returns from the decisions with the benefit 
of regional proximity. Malloy (2005) finds that an analyst covering firms in close 
proximity provides more accurate forecasts. The research on equity analysts is in 
line with the previous findings on mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz 2001) in the 
sense that regional proximity provides an informational advantage. 
In addition to the informational advantage of investment professionals, Pirinsky 
and Wang (2006) document that co-movements of the stock returns are stronger 
when their headquarters are located in close proximity. The authors find stronger 
co-movements when the stocks are traded more by less experienced individual 
investors who are not as equipped with sophisticated financial knowledge and who 
rely more on regional information resources. Such co-movements, the authors 
argue, reflect the fact that a geographic element plays an important role in pricing 
equities. Zhu (2002) proposes a different perspective to explain why individual 
investors are overweight on nearby companies when constructing their stock 
portfolios. Their perspective indicates that individuals buy more regional stocks not 
because they are savvier in their understanding of local businesses but rather 
because they are more familiar with the enterprises and, therefore, become more 
agile at responding to pricing-moving corporate issues. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) expand the subject, linking regional factors to investors’ stock-picking 
behaviors in an international study. Using Finnish individual-level data, they report 
that individual investors trade more on companies located closer to their homes.  
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) also argue that state-level economic variables 
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predict the returns of stocks of which the headquarters are located in the same state. 
One of these authors’ contributions to geographic studies within the body of 
financial literature is an extension of the co-movement phenomenon captured 
among closely located companies in a nationwide context. The paper also presents 
a possible rationale behind this type of co-movement, holding that the equity 
performances of companies in the same region are affected by common economic 
factors.   
For individual-level studies, Hong et al. (2004) show that stock market 
participation is affected by social interactions. They point out that people who more 
actively interact with neighbors tend to invest more in equity markets, interpreting 
this finding as evidence that an individual feels more attached to markets of which 
their friends are a part (see also Brown et al. 2005).  
Froot et al. (1999) present more direct evidence supporting the contention that 
regional components are priced into equity valuation. They compare the stock 
returns of companies of which shares are simultaneously listed on multiple stock 
exchanges around the globe. The rationale of their empirical test design is that 
stocks should show identical returns as long as the underlying businesses are 
identical. However, they found that the returns of stocks traded on multiple 
exchanges deviate from each other. The only difference among these stocks is that 
they are listed in different locations. With this evidence, the authors elect region-
specific factors to explain the deviations.  
Hong et al. (2005) test how social interactions among investment professionals 
influence their stock-picking behavior and report that mutual fund managers living 
in same local community show similar patterns in their portfolio selections. In the 
paper, they also find that fund managers whose workplaces are located in different 
regions still show similar stock-picking patterns as long as the individuals reside in 
the same area. The paper concludes that living in the same region has as much of 
an impact as working in the same region in establishing social bonds and in sharing 
common views. 
On a different note, recent studies well recognize the importance of the impact of 
geographic factors on corporate behavior. More recently, Dougal et al. (2015) find 
that a firm’s investment is significantly related to the investments of other 
companies of which the headquarters are in close proximity to the firm. The paper 
argues that the co-movements of the capital investments are found even among 
companies coming from different industries, as long as the firms locate their 
headquarters in the same region. The authors interpret this as evidence that locally 
clustered economies play a role in determining the level of corporate investment. 
One possible channel by which regional factors affect corporate behavior was also 
recently reported (Gan 2007). She contends that Japanese companies use their real 
estate properties as collateral to back new capital expenditures. As the price of the 
asset class is highly sensitive to the regional economy, a crash of the real estate 
market deters firms from executing new investments, possibly due to the lack of 
sufficient collateral to support the new projects. In a similar vein, Chaney et al. 
(2012) claim that the appraised value of real estate properties has a positive impact 
on corporate investment when the properties are used as collateral to finance new 
projects.  
Another stream of studies focuses on what factors influence companies when 
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they choose the venues for their corporate headquarters. Carlton (1983) points out 
that regional labor costs, energy prices, taxes and municipal incentive programs, 
and regional technical advantages are the determinants, while an excellent airport 
system and the clustering of firms within same industries are also important 
considerations (Strauss-Kahn et al. 2009). Start-ups are less likely to bloom in 
states with higher tax rates (Papke 1991). Garcia-Mila et al. (2002) note that local 
governments, securing their tax base, provide tax incentives to firms willing to 
relocate headquarters to their municipalities. 
Aksoy and Marshall (1992) study how corporate restructuring affects the local 
economies. As the restructuring effort cuts employment and causes firms to be 
more dependent on outsourcing, local economies become less vibrant. Davis and 
Henderson (2008) divide factors determining the location of the corporate 
headquarters into elements beneficial to manufacturing aspects and elements 
influencing the sales side. Henderson and Ono (2008) argue that there exists a 
trade-off between locating the head office closer to a metropolitan area and 
positioning the office close to production facilities. The authors maintain that 
headquarters in an urban location make it easier to contract out to support sales 
activities, while the location choice requires firms to exert more effort in managing 
production activities that occur far from the firms’ headquarters. 
Duranton et al. (2001, 2005) argue that the regional advantage of locating the 
head office in an urban area changes from sector specification to a functional 
specification. Ghosh et al. (1995) find that relocating the corporate headquarters 
induces subsequent stock price movements. The authors report empirical evidence 
showing that stock markets undergo a positive reaction to the relocation of 
corporate headquarters when the relocation is related to cost reductions.  
For studies dealing with other geographical issues within the corporate finance 
context, Uysal et al. (2008) find that companies acquiring target firms located in 
nearby regions record higher returns than companies buying entities located farther 
away. Jaffe et al. (1993) study the spillover effect of new patents within nearby 
regional areas and find that a patent issued by an entity is more likely to be cited by 
companies located in the same state. Using European data, Orpurt (2004) finds that 
analysts more familiar with specific regions are better at forecasting the 
performance of companies active in those regions. 
Although previous papers suitably provide firm-level analyses of the relationship 
between the locations of firms and how they affect corporate behavior, how 
geographic factors at the individual level affect corporate behavior is rarely 
touched upon within the corporate finance context. This paper provides new insight 
into the individual-level analysis of the geographic influence on corporate behavior 
by studying how the CEO’s residential proximity is related to the profitability of 
their companies. 
As noted earlier, the existing literature mostly views geographical proximity as 
an intermediary through which economic agents share knowledge, build social 
networks, and achieve early access to location-specific information. This paper 
differentiates itself from the literature in the sense that proximity is not merely a 
transmitter by which nearby knowledge spreads or economic agents gain 
informational advantages on region-specific factors. In contrast, we argue that 
proximity can occasionally be a result of personal commitment, a status quo made 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 38 NO. 4      CEO to the Rescue  9 
by corporate CEOs exerting themselves to revitalize their businesses after a 
downturn. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
A. Sample Selection and Data Construction 
 
To be qualified as a sample firm for our analysis, a firm needs to be incorporated 
in Korea, privately held, and have sibling firms managed by the same CEO. As our 
main research question is how the CEO’s residential proximity to their firm is 
linked to the firm’s profitability, pairs (or trines) of private firms affiliated within 
the same business group become ideal candidates for the reasons explained in 
section I.  
Out of approximately 20,000 private firms incorporated in Korea whose 
externally-audited accounting information is available, we identify 1,717 firms that 
are classified as affiliates of private business groups. Out of the 1,717 firms, we 
finally carve out 127 sample firms controlled by 66 CEOs. We define a private 
business group as a family of private firms controlled by the same controlling 
shareholders. Records of the shareholding of the CEOs of the sample firms tell that 
all of the CEOs of our sample firms are also controlling shareholders of the 
companies. 
We download the financial data of the private firms from KIS-Value, a Korean 
electronic data provider which collects financial information for both listed and 
private companies. Private companies in Korea are required to report audited 
financial statements to DART once the company’s total assets exceed KRW 10 
billion, equivalent of USD 10 million. Financial data providers such as KIS-Value 
collect and rearrange the contents from the financial statements for public use. In 
most cases, the footnotes of private companies’ financial statements also contain 
ownership data at the end of each fiscal year. While unlisted companies are not 
obligated to report their ownership structures, most firms voluntarily report such 
information. Information on shareholdings is collected manually from the financial 
statements to be used as control variables in various empirical analyses conducted 
in this paper. 
In addition, we gather time-series address information of CEO residences and 
the headquarters of their firms and calculate the distance between the CEO 
residence and the head office. We trace changes in headquarters’ addresses from 
annual audit reports, while assembling CEOs’ residential posts from each firm’s 
corporate registration records. As noted above, the Korean Supreme Court runs a 
public corporate registration system (www.iros.go.kr) which discloses a variety of 
information whenever there is any change. It also shows when CEOs’ residential 
addresses change. Using a virtual navigation service provided by a domestic portal 
site (map.naver.com), we measure the distance from the residence to the 
headquarters. We then record the changes in the distance between the CEOs’ 
residences and their firms’ headquarters every year.   
Even the shortest commuting route can take many hours if the route traverses 
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congested areas. In such a case, measuring the driving distance does not serve well 
as a proxy for commitment. The virtual navigator used to measure distance presents 
multiple routes when asked to provide possible driving routes from one location to 
another. The service provider not only provides the path with the shortest distance 
but also that with the shortest driving time reflecting traffic conditions. For 
empirical tests in this paper, the route allowing the shortest commuting distance is 
chosen for calculating the distance only if the route allows the shortest driving time 
as well. 
 
B. Main Findings  
 
Our basic empirical test strategy is initially to identify the relationship between  
the level of the CEO’s residential proximity and the level of accounting performance 
of the firms under the CEO’s control. Next, we investigate whether changes in 
proximity are related to changes in corporate profitability over time within each 
sample firm. We implement the two tests, respectively, and confirm that both the 
level and changes of residential proximity are positively correlated with accounting 
performance, even after controlling for CEO- and industry-fixed effects.  
Table 1 summarizes the distances from the CEOs’ residences to the pairs of firms 
  
TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table displays information about the geographical distances between the sample 
firms’ headquarters and their chief executive officers’ residences, along with various 
characteristics of the firms. Panel A shows the distance data and accounting information 
as of the end of 2014. All distances are in kilometers. “Distance: CEO residence vs. HQ” 
is the shortest road length between the two locations, automatically calculated by a 
Korean local geographic information provider (map.naver.com). “Distance: HQ vs. HQ” 
is the shortest road length between two firms’ headquarters under the condition that the 
two firms are controlled by the same CEO. Panel B presents the time-series variation of 
“Distance: CEO residence vs. HQ.” All accounting information is on an annual basis. Bil 
KRW stands for Korean won in billions. For reference, one Korean billion won is 
approximately equal to one million US dollars. Total number of sample firms and CEOs 
are 127 and 66, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Sample Firms’ Characteristics (as of 2014) 
Variables N  Mean SD Min Max 
Distance (km): CEO residence vs. HQ 103  62.02  93.09  0.00  388.54  
Distance (km): HQ vs. HQ  64 102.90  118.25  0.00  464.00  
Foundation Year 127   1992 9.17  1969 2007 
Total Asset (Bil KRW) 127  44.97  33.92  10.65  204.00  
Total Sales (Bil KRW) 127  48.40  36.74  2.35  173.00  
Return on Equity (%) 127   4.83  6.70  -24.06  23.01  
Gross Margin (%) 127  17.80  15.73  -29.69  76.57  
Operating Margin (%) 127   3.85  7.98  -34.23  20.64  
Net Income Margin (%) 127   2.97  8.72  -40.50  34.32  
Panel B: Time-series of CEO Residential Proximity to the Corporate Headquarters 
Fiscal Year N  Mean SD Min Max  
2010  90  53.20  78.34  1.53  359.18  
2011  97  57.01  84.24  0.83  385.44  
2012 101  59.47  88.09  0.00  385.44  
2013 105  61.89  92.30  0.00  388.54  
2014 103  62.02  93.09  0.00  388.54  
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This figure is a visual image of the geographic locations of 103 Korean private firms managed by CEOs who control at least two private firms as 
of the end of 2014. Numbers on the X-axis are the longitude, while those on the Y-axis express the latitude. 
 
FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF CEOS RESIDENCE AND FIRMS UNDER THEIR CONTROL (AS OF THE END OF 2014)
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controlled by each CEO. South Korea is roughly 500 kilometers long from north to 
south and major industrial complexes are concentrated around Seoul and Busan, 
the centers of the northern and southern economies. As shown in the table, the 
average distance between the CEO residence and the firms under their control is 62 
kilometers, approximately 40 minutes when driving. By examining distances 
between the residence and companies which exceed 400 kilometers, we also find 
that a few CEOs live at one end of the country while managing companies located 
at the other. Figure 1 visualizes where CEOs lived and worked between 2010 and 
2014.  
Most of our sample firms are located in one of the two major industrial 
complexes, one around Seoul (northwest) and the other close to the city of Busan 
(southeast), while the location distribution of CEO residences is more widely 
spread outside the industrial complex areas. The fact that the locations of corporate 
headquarters are not always within reasonable driving distances from the CEOs’ 
residences, as shown in Figure 1, implies that CEOs managing multiple private 
companies sometimes live far from their corporate headquarters and potentially 
show different commitment levels with regard to the daily operation of the 
companies. Measurement of the commuting distance as a proxy for the level of 
commitment means that the distance measured should reflect how much easier it 
becomes to undertake daily business operations once the distance is shortened. 
Therefore, we measure the distance not from a direct linear perspective but 
according to the driving distance, as the driving distance becomes a better proxy 
for the CEO’s commitment to their business and, therefore, makes the actual 
driving distance a better measurement of commitment. Panel B in the table displays 
relatively minor mean variation across the years, implying that relocations of CEO 
residences or corporate headquarters do not occur frequently. The fact that CEOs 
do not move often also supports the contention that individuals’ decisions to 
relocate their residences are not easy and, therefore, such relocations aptly deserve 
attention. From an econometric perspective, the fact that the distance between the 
CEO residence and corporate headquarters is not volatile over time creates a severe 
autocorrelation among the distance variable year over year. As a result, clustered 
standard errors of any regression analysis using the distance variable become 
inflated, weakening the power of such an analysis. 
In Table 2, we regress the level of profitability of the sample firms on variables 
that may affect the profitability for each company.3 The key variable of interest is 
the level of the CEO’s residential proximity to their corporate headquarters. In the 
regression, we control for size, leverage, and whether or not a given company is 
located in an industrial complex as designated by the Korea Industrial Complex 
Corporation, along with equity shareholdings of the company possessed by its 
CEO. As some CEOs are genuinely more capable of managing companies or 
companies in specific industries yield higher profit margins, we run regressions
 
3The CEOs of private firms may relocate their residences due to the reasons other than the level of their 
professional commitment. If a CEO’s residential relocation is decided upon for educational or lifestyle reasons, 
this type of relocation is highly likely to bring them closer to either a metropolitan area or a high-end residential 
district. We find only six occasions of a change in address implying such advantages. For the empirical analyses in 
this paper, regressions are re-run after excluding the six cases. We find no significant changes in outcomes from 
the supplementary tests.  
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TABLE 2—LEVEL OF DISTANCE (CEO RESIDENCE VS. CORPORATE HQ) AND  
ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE 
This table displays the results of multivariate regressions where the dependent variables 
are accounting profitability measures. Fixed effects are controlled for identical business 
groups and industries. The four-digit and five-digit Korean Standard Industrial 
Classification Code (“KSIC”) specifications apply to the industry allocation for each 
sample firm. Explanatory variables include the distance between the CEO residence and 
the corporate headquarters (“HQ”) under his/her control at a given year. Growth in total 
assets (%) means year-over-year changes in total assets. CEO’s shareholding represents 
the percentage of equity shareholding that each CEO possesses for the companies under 
the individual’s control. The industry complex dummy equals one if the corporate 
headquarters are in an industrial complex. Whether a certain HQ is located in an 
industrial complex is determined based upon a guidebook released by the Korea 
Industrial Complex Corporation (www.kicox.or.kr/home/facility/sevice_link01.jsp). Free 
cash flow from financial activities denotes the net cash inflow from financing activities 
and directly comes from corporate cash flow statements. Cash flow from investment 
activities denotes net cash inflow from corporate actions related to capital expenditures 
and comes from the cash flow statements issued as a part of the financial statements 
externally audited and reported to DART (Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer), which 
is a data warehouse managed by the Korean Financial Supervisory Service (“FSS”). 
FCFF stands for free cash flow for the firm and refers to the net cash inflow during each 
fiscal year. Foundation year denotes the year when each sample firm was founded. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: KSIC Four-digit Industry Classification 
Dependent Variable (%): OP Margin NP Margin ROE 
Distance (100km) (CEO residence vs. HQ) -0.046*  -0.047*  -0.050*  
(-1.86) (-1.72) (-1.77) 
Changes in capital investment (x10) 0.544  0.544  0.048  
(0.37) (0.34) (0.29) 
Debt-to-equity ratio -0.135***  -0.214*** -0.116*** 
(-5.45) (-7.88) (-4.22) 
CEO’s shareholding -0.001  -0.001  -0.206  
(-0.74) (-0.72) (-0.95) 
Industrial complex dummy -0.006  -0.012  -0.211  
(-0.41) (-0.69) (-0.12) 
Total assets (Mil KRW) 0.352*  0.013  -0.033  
(1.88) (0.06) (-1.60) 
Growth in total assets (%) -0.419  -0.354  -0.021  
(0.24) (0.36) (-0.52) 
Sales growth (%) -0.458*  -0.953*** -0.057**  
(-1.79) (-3.41) (-2.36) 
Free cash flow from financial activities/FCFF 0.000  0.000  0.000  
(1.06) (1.68) (-0.23) 
Free cash flow from investment activities/FCFF -0.010  -0.009  -0.008  
(-0.81) (-0.66) (-0.59) 
Foundation year -0.012  -0.070  -0.010  
(-0.08) (-0.45) (-0.64) 
Business group (CEO) fixed effect Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect (four-digit) Y Y Y 
R2 30.0% 31.2% 36.2% 
N 535 535 562 
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TABLE 2—LEVEL OF DISTANCE (CEO RESIDENCE VS. CORPORATE HQ) AND  
ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE (CONTINUED) 
Panel B: KSIC Five-digit Industry Classification 
Dependent Variable (%): OP Margin NP Margin ROE 
Distance (100km) (CEO residence vs. HQ) -0.046*  -0.047*  -0.050*  
(-1.86) (-1.71) (-1.77) 
Changes in capital investment (x10) 0.549  0.524  0.047  
(0.38) (0.33) (0.29) 
Debt-to-equity ratio -0.134***  -0.217*** -0.116*** 
(-5.36) (-7.90) (-4.19) 
CEO’s shareholding -0.001  -0.002  -0.207  
(-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.95) 
Industrial complex dummy -0.006  -0.012  -0.214  
(-0.41) (-0.71) (-0.12) 
Total assets (Mil KRW) 0.354*  0.007  -0.033  
(1.89) (0.03) (-1.60) 
Growth in total assets (%) -0.422  -0.339  -0.021  
(-1.18) (-0.87) (-0.51) 
Sales growth (%) -0.455*  -0.969*** -0.058**  
(-1.77) (-3.45) (-2.36) 
Free cash flow from financial activities/FCFF 0.000  0.000  0.000  
(1.07) (1.52) (-0.25) 
Free cash flow from investment activities/FCFF -0.010  -0.008  -0.008  
(-0.82) (-0.61) (-0.58) 
Foundation year -0.041  0.064  -7.640  
(-0.19) (0.27) (-0.31) 
Business group (CEO) fixed effect Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect (five-digit) Y Y Y 
R2 30.0% 31.3% 36.2% 
N 535 535 539 
 
while factoring in the CEO and industry-specific fixed effects.  
To determine whether the relationship between profitability and the CEO’s 
residential proximity is robust, we employ three different profitability measures 
while controlling for industry-fixed effects with two separate industry classification 
codes, one in panel A and the other in panel B. In all of the different classifications, 
we witness positive correlations between profitability and proximity.  
The CEOs of private firms may exert more effort if they see a potential profit in 
new investment projects. To address this possibility, we control for sales growth 
and the ages of sample firms. To check whether ongoing capital expenditure 
projects affect accounting profitability, cash flows from financing and investing 
activities, scaled by the total free cash flow, are also considered as control 
variables. Sales growth is found to have a negative impact on accounting 
profitability. This finding reveals that the firms studied here sacrifice margins to 
boost their sales turnover. 
Next, Table 3 shows the results of firm-level analyses conducted to examine how 
the selection by a CEO of their residence location is linked to changes in corporate 
profitability. The regressions in the table use a value in excess of the industry 
average in the given year, except for changes in the CEO’s shareholdings and 
relocation to an industrial complex. We regress year-over-year changes in the net 
profit margin on the changes of the distance between the CEO’s residence and 
corporate headquarters along with changes in other control variables. We also use 
various industry specifications to calculate values in excess of the industry average, 
but the results are largely unaffected.  
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TABLE 3—YOY CHANGES IN CEO’S RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY VS.  
INNOVATIONS OF EXCESS PROFITABILITY (WITHIN-FIRM ANALYSIS) 
This table reports the results of multivariate regressions for which the dependent variable 
is the year-over-year (“YoY”) changes in net profit and explanatory variables include the 
CEO’s residential proximity to the corporate headquarters under the CEOs’ control. Other 
independent variables are changes in the asset growth rate and the YoY evolution of the 
debt-to-equity ratio. The two independent variables are numbers in excess of the industry 
average for each year. Fixed effects for the same business group and fiscal year are 
controlled for in all regression specifications. For each column, the sample period is from 
2010 to 2014. For profitability measures, industry averages are calculated based upon 
four different industry specifications following the Korea Standard Industry Code 
(KSIC). “KSIC two-digit” is the broadest industry classification, while “KSIC five-digit” 
is the narrowest. The industrial complex dummy equals one if a firm’s headquarters 
newly moved into one of the industrial complexes specified by the Korea Industrial 
Complex Corporation. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ***, **, and * represent the 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 
Industry Classification Two-digit Three-digit Four-digit Five-digit 
YoY changes in distance (100km) (CEO residence vs. HQ) -0.391*** -0.518*  -0.480*** -0.308*** 
(-3.78) (-1.92) (-5.51) (-3.30) 
Excess asset growth (%) -0.366** -0.720*  -0.443*** -0.345**  
(-2.20) (-1.65) (-3.11) (-2.28) 
Changes in excess debt-to-equity ratio -0.390*** -0.312  -0.298*** -0.250*** 
(-4.68) (-1.42) (-4.10) (-3.28) 
Changes in CEO’s shareholding -0.990  -0.307  -0.270  0.037  
(-0.49) (-0.06) (-0.16) (0.02) 
Industrial complex dummy -0.048  -0.047  -0.042  -0.049  
(-1.03) (-0.39) (-1.06) (-1.16) 
Business group (CEO) fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
N 330 330 330 330 
 
The results shown in the table report that as the CEO’s residence becomes closer 
to their corporate headquarters, the net profit margin in excess of the industry 
average improves. This finding is consistent with the findings in Table 2, showing 
that there exists a positive relationship between a CEO’s residential proximity and 
their firm’s accounting profitability.  
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate the positive relationship between CEO residential 
proximity and accounting performance. Subsequently, we investigate under what 
circumstances CEOs relocate closer to their corporate headquarters. In Table 4, we 
compare the four-year average net profit margin before and after each of the 
relocations. We then calculate the differences in net profit margin for each 
relocation instance before and after the relocations and test whether the differences 
are statistically different from zero. Panel A in Table 4 shows that the net profit 
margins, on average, are lower before the CEOs relocate to be closer to their 
corporate headquarters, relative to the margins after this move. The differences in 
the net margins before and after the relocations are statistically different from zero 
(t-value= 1.84). We interpret this as meaning that the CEOs tend to relocate their 
residences when they witness the deteriorated level of the net profit margin. 
Subsequently, the margin improves after the CEOs relocate closer to the head 
offices, possibly showing greater levels of commitment to their business. In 
contrast, Panel C in the table shows that the average net margin declines after the  
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TABLE 4—CHANGES OF NET PROFITABILITY BEFORE/AFTER  
CEOS MOVE CLOSER (AWAY) TO (FROM) CORPORATE HQS 
This table compares the average net profitability of firms before and after the CEOs of 
private Korean firms relocate their residences closer to the corporate headquarters (panels 
A and B) or before and after they move further away from the head offices (panels C and 
D). The average net profitability is the four-year average value of net income/total sales. 
In panel A, “Before (After) Moving Closer to HQ” indicates the four-year average net 
profitability before (after) each of the closer relocations occurs. In panels B and D, the 
difference in the four-year average net profitability between the post-relocation and prior-
relocation time points is calculated for each relocation case. The difference is then tested 
as to whether such a gap is statistically different from zero. “Before (After) Moving Away 
from HQ” in panel C denotes the four-year average net profitability before (after) each of 
the CEO relocations resulting in a longer commuting distance for the individuals. Pr > |t| 
denotes the p-value. ** is the 5% significance level.  
 
Panel A: Four-year Average NP Before/After CEOs Move Closer to HQ 
N Mean SD Min Max 
After Moving Closer to HQ 46 4.74% 6.48% -10.06% 24.33% 
Before Moving Closer to HQ 46 4.03% 5.70% -14.30% 19.19% 
Panel B: Difference in Average NP (Before vs. After CEOs Move Closer to HQ; Within Firm) 
N Mean SE t-value Pr > |t| 
4-yr Post-Relocation minus 4-yr Prior-Relocation 46 0.71% 2.62% 1.84** 7.26% 
Panel C: Four-year Average NP Before/After CEOs Move Away From HQ 
N Mean SD Min Max 
After Moving Away from HQ 83 3.61% 4.02% -8.76% 16.89% 
Before Moving Away from HQ 83 4.29% 3.75% -3.49% 16.67% 
Panel D: Difference in Average NP (Before vs. After CEOs Move Away From HQ; Within Firm) 
N Mean SE t-value Pr > |t| 
4-yr Post-Relocation minus 4-yr Prior-Relocation 83 -0.68% 3.49% -1.78** 7.83% 
 
CEOs move away from the head offices and that the differences in the profitability 
before and after these types of relocations are statistically significant (t-value= -
1.78).  
Panel A in Table 5 shows the ten-year evolution of the net profit margin before 
and after CEOs move their residences closer to their head offices. The panel 
displays a downward trend of the margin before the relocations. The margin marks 
the lowest level (3.16% with a t-value of 2.03) immediately before the CEOs move 
closer. Profitability shows a slow improvement in the four years after the move. 
The profit margin eventually revives five years after the CEO relocations.   
Panel B in the table displays the evolution of net profitability before and after the 
CEOs move further away from their corporate headquarters. The evolution of the 
average profitability in the panel indicates that profitability deteriorates as soon as 
the CEOs relocate farther from their head offices (t+1). After temporary 
rebounding (t+2 through t+4), the net margin returns to its lowest level (t+5). The 
empirical findings from panels A and B in Table V consistently report that private 
companies regain profitability as the top managers move their residences closer to 
the firms, while any relocation resulting in the executives having a longer 
commuting distance coincides with declines in the net profit margin. 
The findings in Table 5 suggest a possible scenario about how CEOs react to 
changing levels of profit margins. It is not until the CEOs witness deteriorated 
margins for consecutive years that they eventually decide to move their residences  
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TABLE 5—EVOLUTION OF NET PROFITABILITY AROUND  
CEOS’ RESIDENTIAL RELOCATIONS TOWARD CORPORATE HQS 
This table shows the changes in the average annual net profitability before and after the 
CEOs of private Korean companies move their residences closer to the corporate 
headquarters (panel A) and before and after the top managers move away from the head 
offices (panel B). The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2014. Average Net Profit 
means the average net profit of a given year for firms when their CEO moves their 
residence closer (away) to (from) the headquarters of the company under their control. 
“Year to CEO’s Closer Relocation” presents the year(s) before or after the year of the 
relocations. Each instance of “Average Net Profit” is tested as to whether net profit is 
statistically different from zero, and the t-values from such tests are presented along with 
p-values (“Pr > |t|”). *** and ** stand for the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Evolution of Net Profit Margin When CEOs Move Closer to Corporate HQs 
Year(s) to CEO’s Closer Move N Average 
Net Profit 
SD Min Max t-value Pr > |t| 
T-4 39 5.85%  7.16%  -7.47% 34.62% 5.11*** <.0001 
T-3 39 4.94%  6.53%  -7.10% 27.01% 4.72*** <.0001 
T-2 41 4.07%  6.06% -13.34% 27.71% 4.3*** 0.000  
T-1 43 3.16% 10.22% -44.98% 27.71% 2.03** 0.049  
T-0 46 4.66%  8.38% -25.90% 29.99% 3.78 0.001  
T+1 39 4.03%  7.29% -19.75% 24.33% 3.45*** 0.001  
T+2 29 3.65%  4.45%  -7.69% 14.83% 4.42*** 0.000  
T+3 20 3.90%  4.87%  -5.94% 13.83% 3.58*** 0.002  
T+4 7 3.49% 10.30% -14.86% 14.88% 0.9 0.404  
T+5 7 5.10%  3.84%   0.91% 10.38% 3.51** 0.013  
Panel B: Evolution of Net Profit Margin After CEOs Move Away from Corporate HQs 
Year(s) to CEO’s Further Move N Average 
Net Profit 
SD Min Max t-value Pr > |t| 
T-2 52 2.99%  6.52% -16.05% 20.76% 3.31*** 0.002  
T-1 58 4.50%  5.57%  -6.36% 21.64% 6.15*** <.0001 
T-0 83 4.10%  6.06%  -8.76% 41.98% 6.16*** <.0001 
T+1 77 2.68%  5.04% -13.45% 12.42% 4.67*** <.0001 
T+2 74 4.52%  5.27%  -5.94% 27.71% 7.38*** <.0001 
T+3 64 4.05%  5.55% -14.86% 15.99% 5.84*** <.0001 
T+4 50 3.27%  6.58% -25.82% 24.33% 3.52** 0.001  
T+5 31 2.32%  5.62% -10.14% 21.25% 2.3** 0.029  
 
closer to their corporate head offices. Considering that CEO residential relocations 
cannot easily be executed often, the officers decide to move their homes closer to 
their offices only after finding profit margins have weakened for several years. 
Once the CEOs decide to commit themselves via their residential relocations, it 
takes additional years until the businesses that the CEOs manage fully regain 
healthy profitability. The results in panel A of Table 5 show that it requires five 
years for such revitalization. After this time, the profit margin rises to 5.10% (t-
value=3.51), a level similar to where it was four years before the relocations. 
Figure 2 provides a visualization of the data in Table 5, showing the evolution of 
the net profit margins in the ten years before and after the CEOs of Korean private 
companies moved closer to their corporate headquarters. This figure delivers an 
easier translation of the results from the table, confirming (1) that the CEOs move 
their homes closer to the corporate headquarters only after they find weakening 
profit margins for several years, (2) that they decide to relocate when the margin 
hits its lowest point, and (3) that it take an additional five years to turn around the 
sluggish business. 
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This figure is a visualization of Panel A in Table V, illustrating the time-varying trend of 
the annual net profit margin around the years when the CEOs of private Korean 
companies move their primary residences closer to the headquarters of the firms. The 
sample period is from 2000 to 2014, and the inspection window used to track the trend is 
ten years across the relocations. T-4 through T+5 denote the years before (after) the 
CEOs’ relocations. Numbers (%) on the vertical axis represent the annual net profit 
margin. 
FIGURE 2. EVOLUTION OF NET PROFITABILITY ACROSS  
CEOS’ CLOSER RELOCATIONS TO CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS 
 
As a final experiment, we study under what circumstances the CEOs of private 
companies relocate their residences closer to their corporate headquarters. If the 
motivation behind such relocations is to boost the profitability of the businesses 
managed by the CEOs, unsound profitability in the past should be linked to the 
CEOs’ decisions. To test this possibility, in panel A of Table VI, we employ logistic 
regressions, with the dependent variable equal to one if the CEOs move closer to 
the head office in a given year and equal to zero otherwise. For the regression 
analyses, we include four-year average changes in the variables. The main 
component of such explanatory variables is the change of the net profit margin 
during the four years before the CEOs moved closer to the corporate head offices. 
Alternative possibilities are that (1) only certain types of CEOs or firms undertook 
residential relocations, and/or (2) only CEOs managing firms belonging to specific 
industries show such behavior. To control for these possibilities, we run the logistic 
regressions while taking fixed effects into account. In two of three regression 
specifications in panel A, poor performance in past influences CEOs to relocate 
closer to their corporate headquarters at 10% significance level.  
Panel B in the table also shows how past performance is related to CEO 
relocation decisions, but based on a different specification. The dependent variable 
is a continuous variable, reflecting the changes in distance from previous years 
while explanatory variables include changes in the net profit margin at t-1. For this 
analysis, we only consider cases where the CEOs move closer to the headquarters 
by more than 10 kilometers. We find that the past year’s decline of net profitability 
3.00%
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is significantly related to the decision by the CEO to move closer. In detail, every 
decline by one basis point in net profitability results in the CEOs relocating their 
homes approximately two kilometers closer to the corporate headquarters. We do 
not find any significant relationship between minor distance changes (less than 10 
kilometers) and previous net profitability. This type of reduction in the sample may 
hamper the reliability of our empirical tests, but apparently a more substantial 
relocation (a reduction of more than 10 kilometers in terms of the commuting 
distance) better captures the possibility that top executives move their homes closer 
to their corporate headquarters with serious resolutions. If a CEO decides to 
relocate closer to the headquarters to supervise her business more intensively, it 
makes more sense to move much closer to it rather than merely to move within 
same local community. We acknowledge that the small sample size in panel B may 
affect the reliability of the tests. 
The results in Table 6 confirm that CEOs tend to relocate their residences closer 
to their headquarters when a negative trend in net profitability arises in the 
previous four years. Additionally, we find that the CEOs of such businesses are 
more likely to move closer to larger businesses (see the results from models 1 and 2 
in the table). The positive relationship between CEO relocations and the size of the 
business implies that CEOs move closer to their head offices when their businesses 
are large, thus requiring of the CEOs more attention to their enterprises. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Existing literature suitably documents what drives corporate CEOs to exert 
themselves to see their businesses thrive, mostly examining their motivation to 
maximize their expected monetary compensation. However, the literature rarely 
finds any specific channel through which CEOs commit to improve the 
management or performance of their companies. In this paper, using a unique 
dataset containing CEO residential information, we present a detailed examination 
of one channel by which CEOs dedicate themselves to better manage their 
companies.  
For econometric concerns, residential relocation is not an event that occurs often 
and, therefore, year-over-year changes in residential proximity are seldom 
pronounced. This non-volatile nature of the variables (e.g., year-over-year changes 
in residential proximity) inflates the clustered standard errors for most of our 
analyses, weakening the power of this analysis. This caveat is inevitable 
considering the invariant nature of residential relocations. We explicitly 
acknowledge this concern and admit that the distinction can potentially exaggerate 
the power of such empirical tests. 
The changes in residential addresses in this study are only detectable when the 
CEOs report such changes whenever they occur. When individuals fail to report to 
the public corporate registration system (www.iros.go.kr), the changes in their 
physical addresses become undetectable. In this sense, our analyses possibly omit 
cases in which CEOs actually move their residences but such relocations are not 
captured in our sample due to their failure to report the changes to the public 
registration system.  
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Studying a group of private companies managed by the same CEO while 
considering various fixed effects during the different analyses partially diminishes 
the risk of concluding false causation but admittedly is far from being complete. 
This paper nonetheless contributes to the current literature by presenting a new way 
to measure the level of CEO commitment. 
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